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TERRY FIRMA: 
BACKGROUND DEMOCRACY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 
Frank I. Michelman* 
I 
Ages ago, I had the excellent luck to fall into a collaboration with 
Terrance Sandalow to produce a casebook now long forgotten.1 There 
could have been no more bracing or beneficial learning experience for 
a fledgling legal scholar (meaning me). What brought us together in­
deed was luck from my standpoint, but it was enterprise, too - the 
brokerage of an alert West Publishing Company editor picking up on a 
casual remark of mine as he made one of his regular sweeps through 
Harvard Law School. A novice law professor, I mentioned to him how 
much I admired a new essay in the field of local government law (a 
subject I was just then trying to learn) by someone I didn't know but 
who lived in that editor's home town of Minneapolis-Saint Paul. The 
essay was Terrance Sandalow's since-become-classic piece on munici­
pal home rule,2 and the West editor arranged to bring the two of us to­
gether to discuss the casebook project that in fact materialized. 
Sandalow's article gained wide and deserved recognition as a jewel 
of municipal law scholarship. Few, if any, could have perceived it at 
* Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard·University. - Ed. The author wishes 
to thank Terrance Sandalow for watching over his shoulder as this Article was being written. 
This Article is inspired by the following works: Terrance Sandalow, Abstract Democracy: 
A Review of Ackerman's We The People, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 309 (1992); Terrance 
Sandalow, A Skeptical Look at Contemporary Republicanism, 41 FLA. L. REV. 523 (1989); 
Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L REV. 1033 (1981); Terrance 
Sandalow, Equality and Freedom of Speech, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 831 (1995); Terrance 
Sandalow, Federalism and SoCial Change, 43 LA w & CONTEMP. PRO BS. 29 (1980); Terrance 
Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162 (1977); Terrance 
Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1975); Terrance 
Sandalow, Social Justice and Fundamental Law: A Comment on Sager's Constitution, 88 Nw. 
U. L. REV. 461 (1993); Terrance Sandalow, The Distrust of Politics, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 446 
(1981); Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for 
the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1964); Terrance Sandalow, The Supreme Court in Politics, 
88 MICH. L. REV. 1300, 1300-03 (1990) (reviewing ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: 
How THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA (1989) ). 
1. FRANK l. MICHELMAN & TERRANCE SANDALOW, GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS 
(1970). 
2. Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the 
Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1964) [hereinafter Sandalow, Limits of Municipal Power]. 
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the time - certainly I did not - as the opening of a distinctive and 
demanding path of thought through what would be the gathering 
thicket of our generation's constitutional-theoretic debates. More than 
a decade would pass before Sandalow started posing questions in the 
grand mode.3 
II 
What are constitutional norms? Seemingly, they arrive as messages 
from something or someone we are supposed to accept as a social 
authority - the Constitution, its authors, or its licensed oracles. En­
cased in those messages are commands, instructions, or statements of 
principles or rules of conduct. These act as norms for.me, or are nor­
mative for me, insofar as my awareness of their content - of their 
"being there" in the message from some social authority - gives me 
reason counter to sheer, brute desire to select certain action choices 
from some range of practically available alternatives, or to prefer 
some options over others. (The reason might be prima facie, subject to 
override.) Norms are in that sense obligatory. Some but not all norms 
are legal norms, and some but not all legal norms are constitutional­
legal norms (hereinafter, for convenience, "constitutional norms"). A 
norm operates on me as a legal norm insofar as its constraining effect 
is a particular instance of a general, presumptive obligation of fidelity 
to law (the possible bases or justifications of which we need not here 
explore). A legal norm is constitutional insofar as what it constrains is 
the exercise of governmental powers, including the power to make 
(other) law. The constraint can be institutional, reserving various 
classes of powers to one or another branch or level of government. It 
can be procedural, scripting the acts and forms for valid exercises of 
powers. It can be substantive, dictating or restricting the topics re­
specting which, the purposes for which, or the results with which pow­
ers may and may not be exercised or, possibly, must be exercised. 
Constitutional norms, then, are particular message-contents having 
directive effects on government operations, and, moreover, effects 
that really do depend on what recipients take these particular mes­
sages to mean. How sure are we that such things really exist and really 
happen? What we see directly, and all we see, are facts of general so­
cial obedience to the pronouncements of "constitutional law" by vari­
ous official bodies. Who knows, though, what factors decisively shape 
these pronouncements? Might they not stem ultimately from causes 
quite aside from attempts by anyone to find out the meanings of any 
message-like things supposedly received from particular sources? 
Maybe, in the end, there are no message-like things constraining gov-
3. See Terrance Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 
653 (1975) (hereinafter Sandalow, Racial Preferences], discussed infra Part IV. 
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ernment action. Maybe there are only the facts about what judges and 
other actors actually do and get away with doing - facts rooted in 
habit, culture, and interest, and quite recalcitrant to control by 
message-meanings. Skeptical views of this sort appear in our debates.4 
Professor Sandalow's name would not appear on your standard list 
of known skeptics. We don't think of him as doubting that the 
American practice of government commendably includes, as a main 
feature, an expectation of compliance with messages issuing from 
someone or something - "the Constitution" or its licensed oracles -
to someone else, containing directive meanings which it is the obliga­
tion of recipients to find out and to follow. "There is not the same 
freedom in construing the Constitution," Sandalow has written, "as in 
constructing a moral code."5 (Note carefully the difference between 
"construing" and "constructing."6) "Limits are implied by the very·na­
ture of the task."7 Like anyone taking this view, Sandalow has to face 
the problem of how a political society acquires authoritative ascer­
tainments of the contents of constitutional messages. 
As usually understood, the problem has two facets: one semantic, 
the other institutional. The semantic aspect is this: Suppose you 
wanted to settle a disagreement about the constitutional law applica­
ble to a case. Suppose further that you had before you someone who 
was guaranteed to know the' answer to whatever precise question you 
put to' him, not itself directly framed as a question of law or legal 
meaning. Exactly what question do you put to your wizard? Do you 
ask him how a typical ratifier of the Constitution would have decided 
the case, supposing he knew then all the social facts we know now? Do 
you ask what result the words dictate - or what range of results they 
allow - in the ordinary language either of the framers' generation or 
of ours? Do you ask which resolution would make constitutional law 
morally the best it can be, or which would maximize social wealth? Do 
4. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1363 (1984). 
5. Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1049 (1981) 
[hereinafter Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation]. 
6. But see infra text accompanying notes 104-105. 
7. Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1033; see also Terrance 
Sandalow, Abstract Democracy: A Review of Ackerman's We The People, 9 CONST. 
COMMENT. 309, 312 (1992) [hereinafter Sandalow; Abstract Democracy] (agreeing with 
Bruce Ackerman that "the absence of a satisfactory theory [of constitutional change] . . .  has 
a corrosive effect on the commitment to constitutionalism"); Sandalow, Constitutional Inter­
pretation, supra note 5, at 1049 (adding that "[t]he question whether legislation is within the 
authority of the federal government must . . .  be decided within a framework which recog­
nizes . . .  that government . . .  as one of enumerated powers. We do not consider ourselves at 
liberty to ignore the question or to answer it merely by demonstrating that the power can 
best be exercised by the federal government"); Terrance Sandalow, Social Justice and Fun­
damental Law: A Comment on Sager's Constitution, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 461, 463 (1993) 
[hereinafter Sandalow, Social Justice] (referring sympathetically to the "common under­
standing" that constitutional law is not coextensive with speculative morality). 
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you ask which resolution most faithfully would track contemporary 
society's prevailing beliefs about fundamental values? Or what? 
The institutional aspect is this: Having decided on a key question, 
to which branch of government or body of officials do we put it when 
what we need is an "institutional settlement?"8 A .fixed answer to the 
semantic question seems bound to affect how one responds to the in­
stitutional question, but the converse also is true. For example, 
Americans might, on the institutional side, feel committed to judicial 
review, or stuck with it, as our conventionally settled means for put­
ting constitutional law into effect. If so, that could help explain, on the 
semantic side, the allure of the view that constitutional-legal meaning 
is to be drawn from the intentions of the framers - "originalism," as 
we now would call it. If constitutional interpretation does thus consist 
in exegesis of written messages launched from outside the current po­
litical and social scenes, it makes obvious good sense to have it done 
by a politically neutral body of exegetical experts.9 That same institu­
tional choice might seem strange, though, if, on the semantic side, we 
sought to explain constitutional-legal discourse as a decidedly nonexe­
getical activity by which "each generation gives formal expression to 
the values it holds fundamental."10 It would be at least initially sur­
prising to say, institutionally, that courts get the last word because of 
their presumed relative detachment from democratic political pres� 
sures, while at the same time saying, semantically; that constitutional 
meaning most aptly is sourced in contemporary society's prevailing, 
but constantly evolving, beliefs about "fundamental values." 
The example is easily generalized. The semantic and institutional 
questions always and inevitably reciprocate.11 Solving the simultane­
ous equation has been a major preoccupation for the field of scholarly 
debate we call constitutional theory. 
Below, I will conduct a critical survey and parsing of Terrance 
Sandalow's contributions to the debate. These contributions are disci­
plined, contentious, stimulating, original, and undoubtedly distinctive 
- although not, of course, completely distant from eontributions of 
8. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1-9 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
9. See Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1034 (suggesting that 
"the view that constitutional interpretation involves primarily an elucidation of the general 
intentions of the framers is . . .  attractive . ; . because it seems to support the institutional ar­
rangements we have established for giving contemporary meaning to the Constitution"). 
10. Id. at 1068 (emphasis added). 
11. See Sandalow, Social Justice, supra note 7, at 463 ("Because of the central role of the 
judiciary in interpreting and enforcing the Constitution, theories of constitutional interpreta­
tion have almost inevitably been influenced by theories about the appropriate distribution of 
power between the courts and other, more politically accountable institutions of govern­
ment."). 
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others.12 If in hindsight they seem dated in some respects (the main 
pieces all appeared before 1993), or if they do not form a completely 
finished theory with all of its parts fully filled in and all of its uncer­
tainties resolved, or if they do not answer every question we can put to 
them, they nevertheless succeed powerfully in putting questions to 
others - to the rest of us - to which satisfactory answers are awaited 
still. They richly repay review. 
III 
Writing on local government law in 1964,13 Terrance Sandalow of­
fered a striking proposal. Courts, he said, ought sometimes to act as 
censors on city lawmaking but without applying any specific statutory 
or constitutional restrictions on city powers. What centrally concerned 
him, in a way soon to be explained, was not constitutional interpreta­
tion but the avoidance of it. Nevertheless, and perhaps quite unex­
pectedly even to Sandalow, the home rule essay marked the opening 
of his special contribution to the debate over the judicial role in the 
effectuation of constitutional norms. 
In many states, constitutions or statutes confer a wide sweep of 
prima facie legislative authority on at least major-size municipalities.14 
The delegations usually can be read as stopping somewhere short of 
allowing cities to legislate for their respective territories or constituen­
cies in whatever ways would constitutionally be open to a state legisla­
ture making laws for the whole state. For example, a state constitution 
may authorize cities to legislate on any and all "local" or "municipal" 
matters. The power usually is further qualified by subjecting local leg­
islative powers to whatever limits state legislatures may impose by 
statutes applicable to all municipalities. The basic considerations fa­
voring such a general set-up are widely understood to be these: On the 
one hand, cities should not have to obtain express enabling legislation 
from the statehouse every time an arguable need appears for some ar­
guably not-yet-authorized type of municipal lawmaking. On the other 
hand, because city lawmaking can pose special risks to legitimate re­
gional or statewide concerns not adequately represented in a given 
12. Sandalow's ideas, while distinct from all of the following, also contain anticipations 
of them all: current common-law approaches to constitutional adjudication, see, e.g., David 
A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001); 
Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Mode/for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465 
(1999), current democratic-experimentalist approaches, see, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles 
F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998), and 
current anti-judicial-supremacist approaches, see, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
13. See Sandalow, Limits of Municipal Power, supra note 2. 
14. The matters summarized in this paragraph are described and discussed in detail in 
Sandalow, Limits of Municipal Power, supra note 2, at 645-71. 
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city's internal democratic processes, the state legislature should retain 
its ability to impose generally stated bounds on city legislative powers. 
Among the putative transmunicipal concerns motivating the reser­
vation of state legislative control, the most obvious are concerns about 
oppressive or inconsiderate extraterritorial applications or impacts of 
city legislation.15 What will more directly engage us here is perception 
of a different sort of risk - the risk that city legislation, even if its ex­
traterritorial effects are negligible, may threaten values that are basic 
in the view of the state as a whole. The term "values" here typically 
refers to the same family of considerations that inspire constitutional 
bills of rights, including individual liberty and equality and political 
democracy. (In later writing, Sandalow would link them closely with 
"conceptions of the proper role of government in our society."16) The 
idea is that due regard for such values may require restraint of city 
legislative powers even when a court would not, or ought not, con­
clude that the city legislation in question is unconstitutional. For ex­
ample, a city might adopt an ordinance or charter provision imposing 
sharp restrictions on "independent" candidacies for city elective office. 
Even supposing the restriction is not unconstitutional,17 the thought 
runs, it is still desirable to leave the last word on its permissibility to 
someone regarding the matter from the standpoint of the state's con­
stituency as a whole. 
Such was Sandalow's view, and it leads to the question of a possi­
ble role for the courts in the requisite policing of city legislation. Typi­
cally, state constitutions provide sufficient, if inexact, textual handles 
for such a judicial role should courts see fit to use them. For example, 
a court might for this purpose seize on the constitution's having re­
stricted its initial grant of city lawmaking power to legislation dealing 
with "municipal" matters. The court then could hold our illustrative 
ballot-access measure ultra vires as "unmunicipal" (although not oth­
erwise unconstitutional), precisely in virtue of its hard pressure against 
a basic value of freedom of political association. The central question 
posed by Sandalow was: ought courts assume or be assigned such a 
role, and, if so, why, given the availability of the state legislature to 
rein in municipal legislation by general lawmaking?18 
Sandalow's response to the first question was affirmative, his rea­
sons Madisonian. The relative "homogeneity" to be expected of many 
city populations and governing bodies, in comparison with the state as 
15. See id. at 692-707. 
16. Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1165 
(1977) [hereinafter Sandalow, Judicial Protection]; see also infra text accompanying notes 68, 
100. 
17. Cf Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (upholding the constitutionality of a state 
statute of this kind). 
18. See Sandalow, Limits of Municipal Power, supra note 2, at 708-09. 
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a whole, and the relative paucity of contending interests or factions to 
screen out lawmaking that offends seriously against substantial mi­
nority interests, heighten the risk of "majority excesses" and "precipi­
tate majority action,"19 The state legislature's reserved power to hem 
in city lawmaking by general state legislation is a partial safeguard, but 
it is imperfect because of the inertial difficulties of spurring a state 
legislature to action.20 Courts, by contrast, are immediately available 
to make precisely the contextually enriched evaluations that such 
situations require, ·and they are not hobbled by the· organizational, 
procedural, and pluralistic political restraints that (quite properly) 
hobble legislatures. A judicial ruling of "unmunicipal," moreover, has 
only the "suspensive veto" effect of "shifting the level of decision from 
municipal to state government" (because the legislature can always 
pass a general enabling act to authorize city actions of the type in 
question) - an effect that clearly tends to "maximize community val­
ues" once one grants the relative trustworthiness of state, as compared 
with municipal, legislative processes to give such values their dues.21 
Butcannot courts play the desired role, to exactly the constitution­
ally apt extent, simply by enforcing the provisions of state and federal 
bills of rights against municipal legislation exactly as they would 
against state legislation of parallel content? Why, then, launch the 
courts on some additional, transexegetical search for "basic commu­
nity values" to enforce against the legislative products of local. democ­
racy, with the obvious extra risk of undue suppression of local democ­
racy that such a launching involves? 
Sandalow's answer began with the observation - still dependent 
on the Madisonian premise of the state legislature's superior trustwor­
thiness to give basic values their dues - that it is unwise to leave 
courts with no possible recourse against possibly precipitate municipal 
actions, such as our ballot-access measure, except holding them un­
constitutional. A court may be inclined toward a holding of unconsti­
tutionality where it has nothing but the decision of one possibly way­
ward locality to testify to the existence of a sufficient. public 
justification for the resulting restriction of political liberties. But a 
holding of unconstitutionality, once made, will bind as precedent if 
and when "the time comes that the larger community, as represented 
in the state legislature, determines that the general welfare requires" 
the restriction and that constitutional values at least can tolerate it.22 
In that way, due doubts about the reliability of local legislative proc-
19. Id. at 710; cf. Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1191-93 (discussing 
pluralist safeguards in the operations of Congress). 
20. See Sandalow, Limits of Municipal Power, supra note 2, at 714. 
21. Id. at 711, 715. 
22. Id. at 712. 
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esses may tum themselves into an undue judicial suppression of a 
statewide democratic will. 
It remains still to describe some method to be used by courts, once 
loosed from the discipline of ordinary constitutional interpretation, to 
ascertain the content of basic community values and to measure the 
degree of disregard for them contained in any given instance of city 
lawmaking - bearing in mind that the method must be one that does 
not lead courts to trespass unacceptably on the proper domain of the 
legislature. Sandalow's home rule essay does no more, and purports to 
do no more, than make a start on showing how it may be possible to 
delineate such a method. 
Acting in their role as guards against precipitate local action, 
courts are to invoke values that are "deeply rooted" not just at large in 
the community but "in the legal system."23 Thus, for example, the 
"novelty" of a piece of city legislation may weigh against it. But per­
haps most obviously and simply, it follows from Sandalow's argument 
that a city law that would be found to "raise[] a substantial constitu­
tional question" if enacted by the state legislature should not survive 
judicial review for unmunicipalness.24 To that extent, constitutional 
bills of rights can provide a "starting point" and an "analogy" for this 
ilk of judicial judgments. Nevertheless, if Sandalow's argument had 
stopped right there it would still have left us able to distinguish be­
tween a freer-ranging (but somehow still judicial) process of basic­
value detection, special to the context of city legislation, and a more 
familiar and insinuatedly more conventionally disciplined process of 
constitutional interpretation. The argument, then, would have carried 
no interesting implications for standard-form constitutional interpreta­
tion. 
The argument, however, did not stop there. It went further, be­
cause Sandalow wished to head off an easily anticipated objection: 
that it cannot be any business of an independent judidary to contra­
dict the people's elected representatives - even their local elected 
representatives - on the matter of the contemporary community's ba­
sic values. That objection is precluded, Sandalow said, to anyone who 
accepts in general the judicial "power to invalidate legislation on con­
stitutional grounds." Permitting judges to do that, he said, involves no 
different or greater encroachment on representative democracy than 
would be wrought by "authorizing uudicial] invalidation of novel mu­
nicipal powers inconsistent with basic values."25 This is true, wrote 
Sandalow - adding tµat most lawyers know that it is true - even 
granting that constitutional interpretation is "to some extent circum-
23. Id. at 716, 717. 
24. Id. at 720. 
25. Id. at 721. 
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scribed by the language of the constitution and the course of constitu­
tional history."26 Sandalow thus pointedly denied that "constitutional 
interpretation" names a more tightly or objectively disciplined method 
of judicial decisionmaking - or even a substantially different method 
- than that involved in comparing a city law with the contemporary 
statewide community's basic values. 
The home rule essay ends wi.th this denial, leaving it unexplained 
- except, perhaps, for one remark a few pages earlier, in a different 
context, to the effect that "the fundamental values of the community 
are not static; they are in a process of evolution. "27 That community 
values change continuously over time - or, if you like, "evolve" - is 
a hard proposition to deny. Nothing follows, however, about whether 
constitutional meanings change apace unless you already have estab­
lished an equation or linkage between constitutional meanings and 
contemporary community values. Needless to say, the claim of such an 
equation is highly controversial in American constitutional culture. No 
argument for it appeared in the home rule essay. 
IV 
Nor did a full one appear in 1975 when Sandalow - in an article 
supporting the constitutional permissibility of racial preferences in 
higher education28 - first turned his attention directly to what he 
called "the great question of constitutional law," that of "the means by 
which the [Supreme] Court can accommodate" the "democratic val­
ues" ensconced in our constitutional tradition with "the need to rec­
ognize evolution in the [other] values to be accorded constitutional 
protection."29 Certain premises were apparent in this way of framing 
the question: that a main point of the practice of constitutional law is 
to keep government operations in line with certain values; that the 
values thus to be redeemed are both traditional and evolving, but most 
fundamentally are the values "of our [contemporary] society," which 
means they are not drawn from some source above, before, or outside 
it;30 that they include both substantive values, of the sort that particu­
lar political decisions always must implicitly order in some way, and 
the democratic procedural values calling for. "politically responsible 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 718 (offering this, along with the idea of local governments as sites of relatively 
safe "experimentation in the accommodation of competing values, " as a reason for cautious 
use of any roving judicial commission to invalidate municipal legislation). 
28. Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3. 
29. Id. at 662-63. 
30. Id. at 700. The point would become more emphatic in subsequent writings. See infra 
Parts VI-VIII. 
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institutions"31 to resolve disagreements over orderings of substantive 
values. A final, if somewhat disconsonant, apparent premise was that 
the decidedly unrepresentative Supreme Court plays some sort of 
leading role in the pursuit of the required accommodations among 
values.32 
The racial preferences article argues at length33 that in equal pro­
tection litigation - assuming we are not simply to drop the subject of 
the compatibility of legislation with the equal protection guarantee, "a 
move toward which neither the Court nor its critics" (nor Sandalow) 
"seems disposed"34 - there is no escape from the judiciary's "substi­
tut[ing] its judgment for the legislature's on the relative merits of 
competing social goals."35 To speak more exactly, though, what 
Sandalow showed beyond a doubt is this: to find that a law discrimi­
nates impermissibly against some person or class of persons, or treats 
"unequally" some person or class, is necessarily to reject the law­
maker's implicit selections and rankings of social goals in favor of 
some different selection and/or ranking. It does not precisely follow, 
and Sandalow did not show, that the adjudicating court must substi­
tute its own goal-ranking choices for the legislature's. A court impos" 
ing goal- or value-rankings upon a legislature still might purport, in 
perfectly good faith, to draw such rankings objectively, from sources 
beyond and prior both to its own action and to the legislature's and by 
methods other than ungoverned choice. Such sources might include 
constitutional history, text, and tradition; such methods might also in­
clude exegesis or, oppositely, transcendent moral or economic reason. 
Nevertheless, in the face of such obvious alternatives and with lit­
tle supporting argument, Sandalow in 1975 proclaimed the view that 
"[c]onstitutional law evolves to reflect the changing circumstances and 
values of our society."36 "Few would wish it otherwise,"37 he added, as 
if the proposition explained itself. Pragmatic reasons for it leap to 
mind, which Sandalow would mention in future writings.38 Still, this 
31.  Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3, at 662. 
32. See id. at 700 (apparently acceding to judicial review as "the institutional mechanism 
that has developed for giving meaning to the Constitution"). 
33. See id. at 654-81. 
34. Id. at 661. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 700. 
37. Id. 
38. See Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1046 ("The amendment 
process . . .  simply will not sustain the entire burden of adaptation that must be borne if the 
Constitution is to remain a vital instrument of government."); Terrance Sandalow, Equality 
and Freedom of Speech, 21 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 831, 833 (1995) [hereinafter Sandalow, Free­
dom of Speech] (warning that a result of tying constitutional adjudication to "principles for­
mulated in response to issues very different from those we now confront" will be that the 
contemporary issues "will not be intelligently resolved"). 
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central proposition - for that is what it turns out to be - of 
Sandalow's constitutional thought stands obviously in need of a more 
substantial defense, if only because of its keenly paradoxical feel when 
combined with seemingly irreversible acceptance of a key role for the 
Supreme Court in the effectuation of constitutional law.39 Sandalow's 
choice on this occasion, however, was not to defend the proposition at 
length. 
Of course there can be no doubt, and Sandalow showed, that 
community values and value-orderings inevitably change over time, 
along with changes in perceptions of social reality.40 But the proposi­
tion that constitutional-legal meaning is yoked to social-value change 
is different, and much more controversial. Sandalow left unmentioned 
- possibly because it was nowhere near so well developed then in the 
debates as it has since become41 - the contrary view that the Constitu­
tion's meaning as law remains, and for the sake of democracy must re­
main, as it was made by those with self-governing authority to make it 
(the people) until they see fit to make it over (by amending the 
Constitution). 
How, after all, might we confer upon constitutional law a demo­
cratic credential, a democratic pedigree, if doing so seemed important 
to us? (It has not always seemed, and does not now seem, overridingly 
important to everyone.42) Most straightforwardly, we would do it by 
explaining, if we could, how the people of a country, its demos, from 
time to time actually do legislate the constitution. That is the "demo­
cratic positivist" idea, as we may call it, to which Sandalow in 1975 
paid no mind. He would do so later,43 and it was then that his own an­
swer to the question of the democratic pedigree and legitimacy of con­
stitutional law, understood as a direct expression of contemporary 
community .values, would come into sharper focus. For now, though, 
Sandalow confined himself to the question of how courts possibly 
could play a leading but still judicial role in the effectuation of consti­
tutional law, taking for granted the tight linkage of constitutional-legal 
meaning to evolving community values. 
Marbury-like,44 Sandalow carved out such a role for the courts in 
the course of rejecting the judiciary's claim to a final decisive voice in 
39. See Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3, at 659 ("Unless a particular choice of 
values is prescribed by constitutional tradition, a judicial determination seems incompatible 
with the nation's commitment to democratic decisionmaking."). 
40. See id. at 662, 680-81 .  
41. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6-7 (1991). 
42. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Getting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 93, 111-12 (1995). 
43. See infra Part VII. 
44. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (disclaiming jurisdiction by 
upholding the judicial duty to disregard a statute found to be in conflict with the Constitu­
tion). 
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pending social and political controversies over the use of racial prefer­
ences in higher-education admissions. The key was a theory of politi­
cal responsibility that had first appeared in the home rule essay of 
1964. In the absence of a clear societal consensus against the "value 
choices" implied by adoption of racial preferences, Sandalow thought, 
a deliberate choice in their favor by a state legislature must be consti­
tutionally decisive.45 In such a case, priority must go to the body that is 
the more "politically responsible" - meaning, first, the more recep­
tive and sensitive to information regarding "the impact of a policy 
upon the various segments of the society;" second, the more likely to 
keep its value-ordering judgments attuned to "the values of the citi­
zenry;" and, third, the more amenable to "compromise and accommo­
dation that facilitates development of policies that maximize the satis­
faction of constituents' desires."46 
State legislatures presumably measure up well to these standards. 
(Otherwise, what sense could we possibly make of the professed 
democratic "commitment" of American constitutionalism?47) But just 
as city councils presumptively do not fully measure up,48 unelected 
state boards of regents and university faculties may fall even shorter, 
considering how parochial and how limited, by comparison with the 
population at large, we may expect to be the ranges of the interests, 
loyalties, experiences, and sensibilities of their members.49 "[T)he rea­
sons supporting judicial deference to legislative judgment [do not) 
support equal deference to the judgment of a . . .  law school faculty."50 
Moreover, trying to pretend that they do is bound over time to pro­
duce results that "unnecessarily encroach upon constitutional val­
ues. "51 We learned the argument in 1964:52 either courts treat the de­
terminations of law school faculties with a deference they do not 
deserve, or courts allow themselves to be led by the faculty's obvious 
lack of democratic credentials to produce a holding of unconstitution­
ality that will be excessive if and when a state legislature comes con­
siderately to conclude in favor of preferences. 
45. See Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3, at 696, 698 ("Balancing the dangers 
of . . .  preferences against their potential gains is a delicate, and ultimately legislative, task. 
There is no warrant for the courts to [with]draw the issue from the political forum. "). 
46. Id. at 695. 
47. See id. at 699 ("A commitment to democratic values requires considerable judicial 
deference to deliberate [state] legislative judgments . . . .  "). 
48. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21. 
49. See Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3, at 696. 
50. Id. at 699. 
51. Id. 
52. See supra text accompanying note 22. 
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Sandalow nevertheless maintained that courts should refrain from 
overturning faculty-initiated preferential admissions policies. His ar­
guments to that effect53 need not concern us here. What does concern 
us is Sandalow's call upon courts engaged in constitutional review to 
"develop doctrines that consign ultimate authority" for policy choices 
under evolving basic community values "to the legislature, where in a 
democracy it rightly belongs. "54 
v 
If "democracy" generally prefers legislative to judicial policy 
choice, why does it? What exactly is the democratic ideal? Sandalow 
told us in 1975, not once but twice. It is, he said, the "ideal that gov­
ernment policies ought to respond to the wishes of the citizenry."55 
And it is, he said, the "ideal that politically responsible institutions 
should determine the direction of government policy."56 Thus the 
same essay delivered two nonidentical statements of "the democratic 
ideal" - one cast in terms of process (that "politically responsible in­
stitutions should determine the direction of government policy"), the 
other in terms of outcome (that "government policies ought to re­
spond to the wishes of the citizenry"). In the context of that essay, 
there was of course no contradiction. Whichever way you put it, 
Sandalow plainly meant, the democratic ideal is fulfilled, within 
American society's practical capacity to fulfill it, when a lawmaking 
forum and process are sufficiently "politically responsible." 
In hindsight, we can see three major pieces still missing from the 
developing Sandalovian theory of judicial review as it stood in 1975. 
First, the theory as of then lacked a fully elaborated account of how 
courts - acting judicially as opposed to legislatively - can develop 
their own profiles of contemporary society's basic values, against 
which to test (deferentially) the lawmaking acts of a normally acting 
state or national legislature or to test (more aggressively) those of a 
local or unelected official body. Sandalow never has explained at 
length by what sufficiently disciplined methods judges possibly might 
reach and support the findings he would require of them in constitu­
tional cases: that "the. principles upon which they propose to confer 
constitutional status express values that our society does [now] hold to 
53. See Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3, at 701-03. 
54. Id. at 703; see also Terrance Sandalow, The Distrust of Politics, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
446, 447-50 (1981) [hereinafter Sandalow, Distrust of Politics] (compiling examples of issues 
"remov[ed] from politics [by decisions of the Supreme Court] that, in a democracy, one 
would expect to be resolved by a political process"). 
55. Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3, at 695. 
56. Id. at 700. 
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be fundamental."57 But the general outlines of his response seem clear, 
from this and subsequent work. Never doubting that the present is· de­
scended from the past, Sandalow has felt able to suggest approaches to 
the task using history, text, and precedent in ways not unfamiliar to 
constitutional lawyers - indeed not clearly distinguishable from typi­
cal constitutional-legal argument, except by the implied commitment 
to deference, in the end, to the acts of top-of-the-line representative 
govemment.58 
Second, the theory as of 1975 lacked a full defense of contempo­
rary-values constitutionalism against its looming democratic-positivist 
adversary.59 Why should evolving but unenacted basic community val­
ues provide the touchstone of constitutional meaning? Third, the 
theory, in hindsight, needs further work on the matter of "the demo­
cratic ideal." We have noticed Sandalow's equivocation between a 
process-bound equation of the American democratic ideal with final 
decision of public questions by well-oiled institutions of representative 
government and an outcome-bound equation of this ideal with sub­
stantial correspondence between legislative choices and "the wishes of 
the citizenry." Confinement of the ideal of democracy to a choice (or 
merger) between these two would soon, however, prove controversial. 
In the years to come, some would contend that democracy must en­
compass a good deal more than either - in order, in a liberal mind­
set, to figure as a value at all.60 
VI 
In 1977, Sandalow undertook again to outline a mode of judicial 
constitutional review that would provide worthwhile support for con­
stitutional values and still, "by respecting the ultimate authority of the 
political process to determine the values to be expressed by law," con­
form to "the proper limits of judicial authority in a democracy."61 
Again he made the challenge as hard as it can be, by equating consti­
tutional values with basic, contemporary community value-orderings. 
Such an equation was required, as Sandalow repeatedly would con­
tend,62 by the plain facts of American constitutional-legal history and 
practice. Over the course of that history, applied constitutional law has 
57. See, e.g., Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1069. 
58. See id. at 1055-60; Sandalow, Freedom of Speech, supra note 38, at 831-34; Sandalow, 
Social Justice, supra note 7, at 464-66; infra text accompanying notes 69-74, 79-80. 
59. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41. 
60. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW ch. 1 (1996); FRANK I. 
MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY 11-25, 33-34, 40-51 (1999); Frank I. Michelman, 
Human Rights and the Limits of Constitutional Theory, 13 RATIO JURIS 63 (2000). 
61. See Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1183. 
62. See Sandalow, Abstract Democracy, supra note 7, at 311-12. 
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undergone many glaring alterations that cannot be explained by refer­
ence to any formally adopted constitutional amendment.63 Of course, 
one can always try to explain these alterations as the results of judi­
cially tooled-up interpretations and applications of underlying legal 
principles and rules whose meanings have remained unchanged since 
first they were textually laid down. But Sandalow shows that one can't 
do so convincingly without either wrenching historical enactments out 
of context64 or else casting the supposedly constant, original meanings 
at a level of abstraction so high and decontextualized that the work of 
"applying" them to the major political issues of later times is not truly 
adjudicative, appropriate to a non-popular branch of government, but 
rather involves the sorts of choices that it seems committed democrats 
would reserve to the people or representative government.65 
Sandalow's reasoning from these plainly true facts is simple. 
Granting (1) that the nation has a "democratic commitment[)" to "the 
proposition that the Constitution's legitimacy depends on popular 
consent;"66 and therefore (2) that constitutional meanings "must have 
a purchase on values reasonably attributable to the society;"67 then (3) 
if constitutional meanings have changed, they must have changed in 
tune with changes in basic community values. In sum: "constitutional 
law must . . .  be understood as the means by which effect is given to 
those ideas that from time to time are held to be fundamental in de­
fining the limits and distribution of governmental power in our soci­
ety. "68 
The parallel view of constitutional meanings is that they change 
along with changes in community value-orderings. On that view, it has 
seemed to Sandalow that an independent judiciary cannot plausibly 
compete with a decently well-functioning representative political as­
sembly as the institution best situated to identify constitutional values 
and assign them their due weight in lawmaking. How, he has inquired, 
can courts, "in the end, set their judgment concerning the content of 
[contemporary societal beliefs and attitudes] against a deliberate and 
broadly based political decision[?]"69 Harking back to the conception 
of political responsibility he had spelled out two years earlier,70 
Sandalow in 1977 again found that the outcomes of "broadly represen-
63. See id. at 310-12; Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1038-45. 
64. See Sandalow, Abstract Democracy, supra note 7, at 1046-49, 1064-68; Sandalow, Ju-
dicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1180-81 . 
65. See Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1036-37, 1045-46. 
66. See Sandalow, Abstract Democracy, supra note 7, at 330. 
67. Id. 
68. Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1184. 
69. Id. at 1 186 (emphasis added). 
70. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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tative" political processes are "as close as we are likely to get to the 
statement of a norm that can be said to reflect the values of the soci­
ety. "71 Also again, though, he found the premise of a "deliberate and 
broadly based political decision" to be variably applicable to various 
kinds and levels of lawmaking bodies. He suggested a hierarchy of re­
liability, running from decisions of "Congress after full debate or em­
bodied in legislation recently enacted by most states" down through 
possibly maverick school boards and city councils.72 Without locating a 
particular lawmaking process in the hierarchy, Sandalow thought, one 
could not say whether courts act counterdemocratically or rather pro­
democratically by preferring their own readings of contemporary 
value-orderings to those implicit in the products of that particular pro­
cess. For courts thus to act is antidemocratic where the particular leg­
islative processes rank high. But when legislation comes out of lower­
ranking processes - and that might include even Congress when its 
attentions have not been properly engaged73 - then a court may ad­
vance rather than hinder democracy by forwarding its own readings of 
contemporary value orderings.74 
Sandalow's slight equivocation over "the democratic ideal"75 now 
stands resolved. We see that democracy, for Sandalow, consists finally 
in a kind of outcome and not in a kind of institutional set-up or proce­
dure. Democracy ultimately means a due correspondence between the 
value orderings wrought by representative government's legislative 
acts and the value-orderings currently attributable to society or the 
people. Well-functioning representative institutions are, then, a means 
or medium of democracy, not the thing itself. If democracy is af­
fronted by excessive subjection of representative government to judi­
cial tutelage or restraint, that is not by reason of any intrinsic value as­
cribed to people deciding these things for themselves either directly or 
through representatives. The objection to judicial supremacy is not 
any right people have to active self-government, or any interest they 
have in political autonomy as such. The objection, rather, is that judi­
cial supremacy ·�weakens law's responsiveness to those who are gov­
erned by it."76 A democratic society indeed is defined as one that 
71. Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1187. 
72. Id. at 1186-87. Sandalow's rejection as "undemocratic " of the Court's decision in 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1972), rests in part on his factual view that anti-abortion laws 
were not at the time contrary to any emergent state legislative consensus nor were they the 
product of state legislative heedlessness or inattention. See Terrance Sandalow, Federalism 
and Social Change, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 35-36 (1980) [hereinafter Sandalow, 
Federalism]. 
73. See Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1188. 
74. See id. at 1187; Sandalow, Racial Preferences, supra note 3, at 700-01. 
75. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56. 
76. See Sandalow, Distrust of Politics, supra note 54, at 459 (emphasis added). 
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makes heavy use of politically responsible institutions of representa­
tive government, but that is only because such institutions happen to 
recommend themselves as a chief means by which governmental pol­
icy is channeled into correspondence with "the interests and desires" 
- and one may as well add the values - "of those whose lives it gov­
erns. "77 
Not that representative government is the only available means to 
that end, or in every contingency the most advantageous means. 
Believing that courts do have certain advantages of detachment and 
habituation to reasoned reflection,78 Sandalow would want them avail­
able to challenge - suspensively, not irrevocably - not only the leg­
islative products of local or otherwise politically not-so-responsible 
lawmaking bodies, but even congressional and statewide legislative ac­
tions to the extent that those appear to have been deviant, rash, or de­
liberatively lax. The trick is for courts to find ways of framing their 
judgments in such cases in a way that avoids finality,79 leaving them 
room to defer later to duly considerate, politically responsible proc­
esses coming out the other way. Judicial review thus would become a 
useful "step" in the "political process" of community-values expres­
sion, rather than a "means of imposing limits upon" that process.80 All, 
then, would be well for democracy understood as correspondence 
between laws and contemporary community values - would be, in­
deed, about as good as it ever can get. 
In sum, Sandalow's 1977 contribution fleshes out the claim he 
started in 1964, and extended in 1975, for a process-based differentia­
tion of the strictness of judicial scrutiny of the lawmaking products of 
various sorts of institutions that make law in our country. 
VII 
We turn now to Sandalow's rebuttal of the democratic positivist 
claim: that only from periodic acts of decided legislation by a country's 
people may a court hope to draw democratically tolerable grounds for 
rejecting the legislative acts of representative bodies. The rejection 
came when the time was ripe, in the form of a review of the work of 
our foremost democratic-positivist theorist, Bruce Ackerman.81 The 
first ground of the rejection was the seeming rank empirical failure of 
77. Id. at 468. Sandalow speaks in this sentence of "politics," not "representative gov­
ernment." But context makes clear that "politics" refers to conduct of the "political process" 
of representative government. 
78. See Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1178. 
79. See id. at 1186. 
80. Sandalow, Distrust of Politics, supra note 54, at 447 n.4; see also Sandalow, Judicial 
Protection, supra note 16, at 1186, 1 189. 
81. See Sandalow, Abstract Democracy, supra note 7. 
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democratic-positivist theory to match the facts of American constitu­
tional history and practice - the point being, again, that American 
constitutional-legal content has undergone, over the years, alteration 
too drastic to be explained convincingly as a product either of formal 
amendment or of any honestly "judicial" process of interpretation of 
enacted constitutional texts.82 Evidently, constitutional meaning. has 
changed apace with tinenacted; undeliberated, indigenously, and or­
ganically developed changes in basic community values reflecting 
seismic changes in basic community conditions - changes occurring 
mainly in the social background, not the political foreground.83 To give 
you the flavor: 
A mobilized citizenry did not arise to demand greater sexual freedom, 
but changing sexual mores . . .  nonetheless led to substantial restrictions 
on governmental power to interfere with sexual conduct. A mobilized 
citizenry did arise to demand that government cease discrimination on 
the basis of sex, but it failed to persuade the People . . .  Yet, changing 
societal attitudes toward the social role of women yielded constitutional 
limits on sex discrimination that are, at most, only marginally different 
from those that would have existed if the equal rights amendment had 
been adopted.84 
· 
In other words, if you seek a democratic source for legitimate con­
stitutional law, you may find it in the social background, even if not in 
the political foreground. So far as concerns the manufacture of consti­
tutional-legal content, it is in the background, not the foreground, that 
the demos ultimately works its will: organically, nonfocally, nondelib­
erately, nonlegislatively, through the seismic movements that count­
less people's actions produce over time in the social situations, needs, 
possibilities, and sensibilities that give rise to community values. 
This seems a direct rejection of Ackerman's view. In a democratic 
country, Ackerman believes (as accurately reported by Sandalow), 
constitutional adjudication must mean application of "decisions made 
by the People on those occasions when they have spoken, whether or 
not they have embodied their will in amendments adopted pursuant to 
the procedures prescrib�d by Article V."85 But then how discern that 
the People have spoken? The People, after all, are never corporately 
or instantaneously observable.86 They are counterfactual, an idea of 
populist-democratic reason. Nevertheless, Ackerman maintains, the 
idea of them is capable of being approximately represented by time-
82. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65. 
83. See Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1046-49. 
84. Sandalow, Abstract Democracy, supra note 7, at 324-25; see also Sandalow, Federal­
ism, supra note 72, at 29-30. 
85. Sandalow, Abstract Democracy, supra note 7, at 315 (emphasis added). 
86. See generally EDMUND s. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE (1988) . 
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extended courses of political events.87 Sometimes, Ackerman says, a 
course of events can disclose the existence of a "mobilized majority" 
in favor of some notable shift in the country's officially recognized po­
litical orientation and practice - a majority of the populace, but 
counted by giving special weight to the fraction of them that in its ad­
dress to the pending question is focused, persistent, informed, deliber­
ate, public-spirited, and, finally, deeply persuaded. An Ackermanian 
"mobilized" majority is a clear and strong, sustained and committed 
numerical majority - one that arises, consolidates, and persists over a 
time during which the matters in question are publicly controverted at 
a high level of energy, earnestness, and concern. 
Ackerman's democratic ideal is one of decided, if nonformal, 
higher law-speaking by the People, made effective on ordinary law­
making by courts exercising powers of judicial review. There is har­
mony, up to a point, between this ideal and an ideal conception of de­
mocracy as correspondence-in-fact of legislative value-orderings to 
contemporary community values. The harmony fails to the degree that 
contemporary community value-orderings may have left behind the 
ones expressed by the most recent episodes of higher-law speaking by 
the People, which may have occurred some years ago.88 Still, so far as I 
can see, Sandalow offers no express conceptual or moral objection to 
Ackerman's democracy-based demand for the subordination of gov­
ernment operations to the People's most recent, nonformal, higher­
lawmaking acts. He merely finds it empirically vapid to the point of 
uselessness for judges conscientiously aiming to keep within the 
bounds of the adjudicative function. Where Ackerman sees clearly 
marked elevations of focus and public-spiritedness in the People's po­
litical participation during his designated "constitutional moments," 
Sandalow sees no way for a court to determine whether popular politi­
cal actions over any given passage of time evince any exceptional de­
gree of deliberation or public spirit.89 Where Ackerman claims a suffi­
ciently clear and specific higher legislative content in the People's 
agitations over Reconstruction and the New Deal, Sandalow sees 
endlessly debatable complexity and ambiguity90 - or else, if clarity, 
then again clarity only at a uselessly high level of abstraction.91 "The 
People," writes Sandalow, have "decided too little to nourish judicial 
87. In regard to this statement and the balance of the paragraph, see Frank I. 
Michelman, Thirteen Easy Pieces, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1297, 1312-13, 1314 {1995), and sources 
cited. 
88. See Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Authorship by the People, 74 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1605, 1624-25 (1999). 
89. See Sandalow, Abstract Democracy, supra note 7, at 326-30. 
90. See id. at 318-25, 330-36. 
91. See id. at 325. 
1846 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 99:1827 
judgment on the issues that arise during the long periods of 'normal 
politics.'"92 
VIII 
According to Sandalow's argument, dem()cratic-positivist justifica­
tions of judicial review simply can't withstand the hard facts of tempo­
ral change in judge-declared constitutional-legal doctrine. The same 
facts also, in Sandalow's view, defeat the sort of "rights­
foundationalist" justification that has come to figure as a kind of oppo­
site to democratic positivism.93 
Start with commitment to a "democratic ideal" having these as its 
three "central premises:" that "law should be responsive to the inter­
ests and values of the citizenry;"94 that it should have "the consent of 
the governed;"95 and that "in the long run" it will be thus responsive, 
and have this consent, "only if lawmakers are amenable to popular 
control through ordinary political processes,'�96 affording the governed 
"active and continuous participation . . .  either directly or by represen­
tation."97 The democratic commitment, thus defined, appears to be 
compromised by any subjection of the legislative determinations of 
representative government to final and insuperable displacement by 
courts in the name of any values defined externally and antecedently 
to those very determinations, including so-called fundamental rights. 
The incursion on democratic rule nevertheless might be "tolerable," 
Sandalow allows, for the sake of securing due respect for certain val­
ues aside from democracy - liberty would be an example - assuming 
said incursion is clearly confined, leaving unscathed the main core of 
representative-governmental authority.98 
But the judicial incursion on democracy will be neither warranted 
nor confined unless courts have a special ability to see and to say, 
more or less exactly, what the other values are and what limits they 
impose on democratic choice. Courts might be comparatively well po­
sitioned for. such work, if the other values were once and forever fixed: 
Sandalow recalls sympathetically the view that the courts' "relative 
isolation from men and events and their commitment to the processes 
of reason" give them a certain kind of comparative institutional ad-
92. Id. at 331-32. 
93. See ACKERMAN, supra note 41, at 10-16. 
94. Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1166. 
95. Id. at 1168. 
96. Id. at 1166. 
97. Id. at 1178. 
98. Id. 
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vantage.99 The advantage vanishes, however, when we see the other 
values in their true light, as changing over time along with evolving 
"conceptions of the proper role of government in our society."100 As 
Sandalow puts the matter: 
The question that Marshall answered [in Marbury v. Madison] was 
whether courts or legislatures should have final authority to resolve con­
troversies about the meaning of a document whose content was (under­
stood to be) fixed at the time of its adoption. The question today is 
whether courts or legislatures should have final authority to resolve con­
troversies about the meaning of a document whose content evolves over 
time.101 
And since the facts unmistakably show that the . "contents" (meaning 
the meanings) of our "document" do evolve over time, we can't de­
fend judicial review as a marginal compromise of the democratic ideal 
for the sake of fundamental rights for all time fixed. 
True, we could think in terms of fundamental rights without 
thinking of their content as being for all time fixed. Community value� 
evolving over time could sponsor similarly evolving ideas about fun­
damental rights. But once we admit that constitutional law thus aims 
to reflect values understood as at all times evolving in the bosom of 
the community, then constitutional meaning, being not tied to any 
"independently existing principles of societal morality," would not be 
fit for final resolution by politically nonresponsible judges overriding 
politically responsible legislatures.102 No advantage then could be 
claimed for the detachment and impartiality of an independent judici­
ary, viewed as an umpire of democratic political struggle bounded by 
rules of the game in the form of non-transgressible individual rights.103 
If the rules of the game are changing rather than fixed, then surely, on 
democratic principles, determination of their content belongs in the 
hands of the players, a.k.a. the People. 
Is all this so obviously so? Granted - by Ackerman and by me -
constitutional content cannot plausibly be understood to be fixed as of 
the times of formal adoption either of the original Constitution or its 
textual amendments. Granted - by me, for the sake of argument -
content can only plausibly be understood as changing continuously, 
through time along with changes in the social background. Sandalow 
seemingly wants to deduce from that premise the conclusion that con­
stitutional contents do not and cannot pre-exist a court's or legisla-
99. Id. at 1178. 
100. Id. at 1165. 
101. Id. at 1165-66. 
102. Id. at 1172 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1179-80 (extending the critique to the 
"suspect classification" branch of equal-protection review). 
103. See id. 
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ture's decisions regarding them; that they rather must be con­
structed,104 meaning created,105 on the very occasions of deciding - in 
and by the very acts of deciding - what they are. If so, then indeed we 
must grant the clear institutional advantage to the politically responsi­
ble legislature over the independent judiciary.106 But why conclude 
that it is so? The premise of constantly evolving value-orderings does 
not support the conclusion of all-and-only "constructed" value­
orderings, if by that we mean orderings that come into being only in 
and through the process of a court's or legislature's deciding or de­
claring what they are. 
True, there is a sense in which anyone's report or rendition of con­
temporary society's up-to-the-minute basic value-orderings must 
involve the reporter in making "choices" that the community itself has 
not "made" and never will make.107 The reporter, no doubt, will be re­
quired to choose, in the sense of identify, the best alternative "con­
struction" from a number of competing reasonable "constructions," 
meaning interpretations, of the societal value-orderings implied by 
some historical series of political and other social happenings.108 But 
someone exercising that kind of interpretative selection or "choice" -
granted that the choice is not deducible from the language or history 
of any particular documents, or from any other form of certified evi­
dence109 - need not and indeed cannot be regarding the object of in­
terpretative choice as one that is brought into existence ("produced") 
only by the choice she will make.110 To the contrary, to interpret or 
"construe" an object is to position that object as one about whose best 
description or accounting people can disagree intelligently, and thus as 
one whose best description or accounting is independent of what any­
one will say about it.111 On Sandalow's own word, there are always 
"elements of reason . . .  intrinsic to [a] process" of selecting the best 
interpretive account of contemporary community values.112 The door 
thus remains logically quite open to a contention that an independent 
judiciary has a better chance of saying worthy things about constitu-
104. Id. at 1170, 1185.  
105. See id. at 1171-72. But see supra text accompanying note 6. 
106. See Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1182 ("If the court is to judge 
from within an evolving tradition . . .  it lacks the fixed point of reference that is necessary for 
deciding whether [community] values were given their due."). 
107. Id. at 1171. 
108. See id. at 1168-70.
' 
109. See Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1054. 
1 10. See Sandalow, Judicial Protection, supra note 16, at 1 173 (asking why, "[i]f constitu­
tional rules are a product of judicial choice," they should "be permitted to control" the acts 
of representative government). 
1 11. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). 
112. Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1055. 
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tional meanings, equated with contemporary community values; than 
a politically implicated, incumbent legislature has. 
IX 
. What logic admits, however, common sense and experience may 
reject. We cannot fault Sandalow for doubting that the latter give us 
much reason to think that small, inevitably somewhat elite or other­
wise narrow judicial bodies are going to do better with assessments of 
contemporary community values than we may expect from the opera­
tions of state and federal legislatures working decently well. To give 
courts a plausible comparative advantage, we must put a substantial 
conceptual distance between the supposedly governing values and 
contemporary social life - as we would do if we sourced the govern­
ing values either in a fixed and transcendent table of rights or in 
somewhat remotely past political enactments. Sandalow, however, has 
denied the descriptive accuracy and the normative adequacy of both 
those sorts of accounts of American constitutionalism. 
His grounds for rejecting them have been multiple and far from 
paltry. First, there have been the plain facts of American constitu­
tional history and the just-as-plain limits on what plausibly can be 
made of these facts. In short, while history belies the fixity of constitu­
tional meanings that moral-universalistic rights-foundationalism would 
imply, historiographical means are not up to the task of showing the 
American People "speaking" at the times and in a manner that credi­
bly could support judicial review in the guise of mere enforcement of 
the law the People have spoken.113 A second ground for rejecting time­
bound democratic positivism is the pragmatic one: principles enacted 
years ago will not deal intelligently with current issues and problems, 
and the formal amendment scheme cannot sustain · the burdens of 
transition.114 And a second ground for rejecting timeless rights founda­
tionalism is the demand, issued in the name of democracy, that the 
law's value-orderings should be determined by politically responsible 
institutions.115 
x 
Behind Sandalow's double-edged critique of the democratic­
positivist and rights-foundationalist approaches to constitutional adju­
dication, motivating it, lies a premise never quite in so many words 
laid down and defended: that the point of constitutional adjudication 
is the effectuation of some set of values, if not sheerly for the sake of 
113. See supra Parts VII-VIII. 
1 14. See supra note 38. 
1 15. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. · 
1850 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 99:1827 
those values then for the sake of due respect for the human beings, be 
they the People or the Framers, whose values they are. It is only that 
premise that gives point to Sandalow's effort to demonstrate that the 
governing values must be those right now held by contemporary soci­
ety. But the premise is a contested one. It is one thing to conclude that 
both a democratic-positivist constitutional practice and a rights­
foundationalist practice are noncredible, given both what history 
shows and the limitations on what it is able to show. It is quite another 
thing to claim that a country needs to have, or in any way benefits 
from having, a practice of constitutional-norm recognition geared to 
anyone's decided account of any set of values. 
There remains, after all, to be reckoned with the view - call it 
constitutional formalism - that what a country relevantly needs, and 
all it relevantly needs, is to have in place an effective, nigh-universally 
recognized and accepted system of positive legal ordering, and that the 
point of constitutional adjudication simply is to uphold the formal rule 
of positive law. Thus if ordinary legislative enactments can be shown 
to violate norms that can, with fafr certainty and near-unanimity, be 
derived by strict and formal legal reasoning from enacted constitu­
tional texts, let .them be stricken. Otherwise, leave them be.116 No 
doubt that would leave the set of judicially operative constitutional 
norms quite shrunken by comparison with what we are used to or with 
what Sandalow-style, contemporary-community-values constitution­
alism would deliver.117 But that would seem exactly the conclusion de­
voutly to b� wished by an ideal conception of democracy as majori­
tarian process, as good conduct under smoothly running majoritarian 
institutions of representative government. 
What is it, then, that motivates Sandalow's attachment to a more 
robust conception of constitutional law drawn from active determina­
tions of the contemporary lie of community values? Evidently, it is 
Sandalow's deeper conception of democracy as outcome and not as 
process - his conception of democracy as consisting in correspon­
dence between the value orderings wrought by representative gov­
ernment's legislative acts and the value-orderings currently held by so­
ciety or the people. I suggested earlier118 that the outcome conception 
of democracy (outcomes corresponding with community values) and 
not the "process" conception (politically responsible, representative 
institutions get to make the final decisions) must have been the deeper 
one for Sandalow, and now we can see an additional ground for my 
suggestion. A majoritarian process conception seems to fit happily 
116. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L. J. 1 (1971). 
117. See, e.g. , Sandalow, Freedom of Speech, supra note 38. 
118. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77. 
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with a constitutional minimalism that Sandalow refrains from em­
bracing. The outcome conception, by contrast, fits aptly with the 
proposition that constitutional meanings are to be drawn, by whom­
ever draws them, from analyses of contemporary community values. 
XI 
We are left with a remark�ble theory of judici�l review, one that 
appears to be unique among contemporary contenders. On the one 
hand, the theory rejects both interpretative formalism and interpreta­
tive minimalism. Far from calling for judicial retirement from the 
field,119 the theory prescribes what only can be called an activist judi­
cial role. It cuts courts loose from bindings either to constitutional 
texts or to the implications of historically verifiable, higher-lawmaking 
events. At the same time, though, it rejects a timeless, moral­
universalist grounding for constitutional law. Indeed, it rejects judicial 
supremacy altogether - although not judicial activism - by de­
manding that the courts seek ways to purge their constitutional-legal 
pronouncements of finality vis-a-vis legislative operations measuring 
up to an achievable standard of political responsibility. In sum: (1) 
courts as courts - courts distinct from legislatures - have an impor­
tant job to do in the project of constitutionalism; (2) that job does not, 
however, consist in overriding cluly considered, legislatively enacted 
value-orderings; (3) and yet it does consist in bringing constitutional 
values effectively to bear on political lawmaking; and finally (4) nei­
ther the People's higher-lawmaking acts nor the timeless truths of mo­
rality provide the courts with standards by which to proceed in doing 
that job. 
How· can such a mix of conclusions possibly make sense and hold 
together? It can and does, if and only if you agree with Sandalow that 
(a) the democratic ideal - m,eaning, in the last analysis, . the American 
constitutionalist ideal - boils down to keeping government opera­
tions, lawmaking included, in tune with basic, contemporary commu­
nity values; and (b) in the practical execution of that ideal, courts can 
play a useful, assistive role to the country's more politically responsi­
ble institutions by lodging into the process, suspensively only, their le­
gally informed and legally reasoned assessments of mismatch between 




I have reservations. They pertain mainly to the conception of con­
stitutional democracy as background democracy, as the due respon­
siveness of governmental outcomes to the basic values of the sur­
rounding society. There is more to democracy than that, I believe,120 
1 19. As, for example, does TUSHNET, supra note 12. 
120. See works cited supra note 60. 
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and there must be on the outspokenly liberal-individualist views put 
forth by Sandalow in some of his later writings, especially given the 
strong assumptions of value pluralism we also find in them.121 In fact . I  
would not bet the ranch that Sandalow's "contemporary community 
values" will not turn out, on extended, close examination, to be stand­
ins or guideposts for certain transcendent-universal liberal verities. 
That would be, however, a story for another time. 
XII 
Constitutional law is serious stuff. What people think about it and 
accordingly do about it can make a serious difference.122 To say so is 
not yet to deny that the best way to deal with constitutional law might 
be to refuse to take it seriously. But don't try telling that to Terry 
Sandalow. Terry stands firm among those who cannot help responding 
to serious matters by trying to think and argue them through, step by 
step.123 By his example, he sets us a daunting standard of rigor, study, 
plain speaking, nerve, and revulsion from cant. A good thing, too, 
even if we cannot always, or ever, quite measure up. 
121. See Terrance Sandalow, A Skeptical Look at Contemporary Republicanism, 41 FLA. 
L. REV. 523, 525, 528-34 (1989); Sandalow, Distrust of Politics, supra note 54, at 453-55, 457, 
468. 
122. I doubt this is controversial. Consider, for example, the difference possibly made by 
what Abraham Lincoln thought and did about constitutional law. See Sanford Levinson, Was 
the Emancipation Proclamation Constitutional? Do We Care What the Answer Is? (David 
C. Baum Memorial Lecture Series on Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, Univ. of Ill. Law 
School, Apr. 5, 2001) (on file with author). 
123. I do not mean he 
·
never writes with irony, wit, or a twinkle in the eye. See, e.g., 
Terrance Sandalow, The Supreme Court in Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1300, 1300-03 (1990) 
(reviewing ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: How THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK 
AMERICA (1989)). 
